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Cr. Yes.
Soc. Could we live, having an evil and corrupted body?
Cr. Certainly not.
Soc. And will life be worth having, if that higher part of man be
depraved, which is improved by justice and deteriorated by
injustice? Do we suppose that principle, whatever it may be in man,
which has to do with justice and injustice, to be inferior to the
body?
Cr. Certainly not.
Soc. More honored, then?
Cr. Far more honored.
Soc. Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many say of us:
but what he, the one man who has understanding of just and unjust,
will say, and what the truth will say. And therefore you begin in
error when you suggest that we should regard the opinion of the many
about just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable.
Well, someone will say, "But the many can kill us."
Cr. Yes, Socrates; that will clearly be the answer.
Soc. That is true; but still I find with surprise that the old
argument is, as I conceive, unshaken as ever. And I should like to
know Whether I may say the same of another proposition- that not life,
but a good life, is to be chiefly valued?
Cr. Yes, that also remains.
Soc. And a good life is equivalent to a just and honorable one- that
holds also?
Cr. Yes, that holds.
Soc. From these premises I proceed to argue the question whether I
ought or ought not to try to escape without the consent of the
Athenians: and if I am clearly right in escaping, then I will make the
attempt; but if not, I will abstain. The other considerations which
you mention, of money and loss of character, and the duty of educating
children, are, I fear, only the doctrines of the multitude, who
would be as ready to call people to life, if they were able, as they
are to put them to death- and with as little reason. But now, since
the argument has thus far prevailed, the only question which remains
to be considered is, whether we shall do rightly either in escaping or
in suffering others to aid in our escape and paying them in money
and thanks, or whether we shan not do rightly; and if the latter, then
death or any other calamity which may ensue on my remaining here
must not be allowed to enter into the calculation.
Cr. I think that you are right, Socrates; how then shall we proceed?
Soc. Let us consider the matter together, and do you either refute
me if you can, and I will be convinced; or else cease, my dear friend,
from repeating to me that I ought to escape against the wishes of
the Athenians: for I am extremely desirous to be persuaded by you, but
not against my own better judgment. And now please to consider my
first position, and do your best to answer me.
Cr. I will do my best.
Soc. Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do wrong, or
that in one way we ought and in another way we ought not to do
wrong, or is doing wrong always evil and dishonorable, as I was just
now saying, and as has been already acknowledged by us? Are all our
former admissions which were made within a few days to be thrown away?
And have we, at our age, been earnestly discoursing with one another
all our life long only to discover that we are no better than
children? Or are we to rest assured, in spite of the opinion of the
many, and in spite of consequences whether better or worse, of the
truth of what was then said, that injustice is always an evil and
dishonor to him who acts unjustly? Shall we affirm that?
Cr. Yes.
Soc. Then we must do no wrong?
Cr. Certainly not.
Soc. Nor when injured injure in return, as the many imagine; for
we must injure no one at all?
Cr. Clearly not.
Soc. Again, Crito, may we do evil?
Cr. Surely not, Socrates.
Soc. And what of doing evil in return for evil, which is the
morality of the many-is that just or not?
Cr. Not just.
Soc. For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him?
Cr. Very true.
Soc. Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to
anyone, whatever evil we may have suffered from him. But I would
have you consider, Crito, whether you really mean what you are saying.
For this opinion has never been held, and never will be held, by any
considerable number of persons; and those who are agreed and those who
are not agreed upon this point have no common ground, and can only
despise one another, when they see how widely they differ. Tell me,
then, whether you agree with and assent to my first principle, that
neither injury nor retaliation nor warding off evil by evil is ever
right. And shall that be the premise of our agreement? Or do you
decline and dissent from this? For this has been of old and is still
my opinion; but, if you are of another opinion, let me hear what you
have to say. If, however, you remain of the same mind as formerly, I
will proceed to the next step.
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