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La. What do you mean, Socrates?
Soc. I will endeavour to explain; you would call a man courageous
who remains at his post, and fights with the enemy?
La. Certainly I should.
Soc. And so should I; but what would you say of another man, who
fights flying, instead of remaining?
La. How flying?
Soc. Why, as the Scythians are said to fight, flying as well as
pursuing; and as Homer says in praise of the horses of Aeneas, that
they knew "how to pursue, and fly quickly hither and thither"; and
he passes an encomium on Aeneas himself, as having a knowledge of fear
or flight, and calls him "an author of fear or flight."
La. Yes, Socrates, and there Homer is right: for he was speaking
of chariots, as you were speaking of the Scythian cavalry, who have
that way of fighting; but the heavy-armed Greek fights, as I say,
remaining in his rank.
Soc. And yet, Laches, you must except the Lacedaemonians at Plataea,
who, when they came upon the light shields of the Persians, are said
not to have been willing to stand and fight, and to have fled; but
when the ranks of the Persians were broken, they turned upon them like
cavalry, and won the battle of Plataea.
La. That is true.
Soc. That was my meaning when I said that I was to blame in having
put my question badly, and that this was the reason of your
answering badly. For I meant to ask you not only about the courage
of heavy-armed soldiers, but about the courage of cavalry and every
other style of soldier; and not only who are courageous in war, but
who are courageous in perils by sea, and who in disease, or in
poverty, or again in politics, are courageous; and not only who are
courageous against pain or fear, but mighty to contend against desires
and pleasures, either fixed in their rank or turning upon their enemy.
There is this sort of courage-is there not, Laches?
La. Certainly, Socrates.
Soc. And all these are courageous, but some have courage in
pleasures, and some in pains: some in desires, and some in fears,
and some are cowards under the same conditions, as I should imagine.
La. Very true.
Soc. Now I was asking about courage and cowardice in general. And
I will begin with courage, and once more ask, What is that common
quality, which is the same in all these cases, and which is called
courage? Do you now understand what I mean?
La. Not over well.
Soc. I mean this: As I might ask what is that quality which is
called quickness, and which is found in running, in playing the
lyre, in speaking, in learning, and in many other similar actions,
or rather which we possess in nearly every action that is worth
mentioning of arms, legs, mouth, voice, mind;-would you not apply
the term quickness to all of them?
La. Quite true.
Soc. And suppose I were to be asked by some one: What is that common
quality, Socrates, which, in all these uses of the word, you call
quickness? I should say the quality which accomplishes much in a
little time-whether in running, speaking, or in any other sort of
action.
La. You would be quite correct.
Soc. And now, Laches, do you try and tell me in like manner, What is
that common quality which is called courage, and which includes all
the various uses of the term when applied both to pleasure and pain,
and in all the cases to which I was just now referring?
La. I should say that courage is a sort of endurance of the soul, if
I am to speak of the universal nature which pervades them all.
Soc. But that is what we must do if we are to answer the question.
And yet I cannot say that every kind of endurance is, in my opinion,
to be deemed courage. Hear my reason: I am sure, Laches, that you
would consider courage to be a very noble quality.
La. Most noble, certainly.
Soc. And you would say that a wise endurance is also good and noble?
La. Very noble.
Soc. But what would you say of a foolish endurance? Is not that,
on the other hand, to be regarded as evil and hurtful?
La. True.
Soc. And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful?
La. I ought not to say that, Socrates.
Soc. Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to be
courage-for it is not noble, but courage is noble?
La. You are right.
Soc. Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage?
La. True.
Soc. But as to the epithet "wise,"-wise in what? In all things small
as well as great? For example, if a man shows the quality of endurance
in spending his money wisely, knowing that by spending he will acquire
more in the end, do you call him courageous?
La. Assuredly not.
Soc. Or, for example, if a man is a physician, and his son, or
some patient of his, has inflammation of the lungs, and begs that he
may be allowed to eat or drink something, and the other is firm and
refuses; is that courage?
La. No; that is not courage at all, any more than the last.
Soc. Again, take the case of one who endures in war, and is
willing to fight, and wisely calculates and knows that others will
help him, and that there will be fewer and inferior men against him
than there are with him; and suppose that he has also advantages of
position; would you say of such a one who endures with all this wisdom
and preparation, that he, or some man in the opposing army who is in
the opposite circumstances to these and yet endures and remains at his
post, is the braver?
La. I should say that the latter, Socrates, was the braver.
Soc. But, surely, this is a foolish endurance in comparison with the
other?
La. That is true.
Soc. Then you would say that he who in an engagement of cavalry
endures, having the knowledge of horsemanship, is not so courageous as
he who endures, having no such knowledge?
La. So I should say.
Soc. And he who endures, having a knowledge of the use of the sling,
or the bow, or of any other art, is not so courageous as he who
endures, not having such a knowledge?
La. True.
Soc. And he who descends into a well, and dives, and holds out in
this or any similar action, having no knowledge of diving, or the
like, is, as you would say, more courageous than those who have this
knowledge?
La. Why, Socrates, what else can a man say?
Soc. Nothing, if that be what he thinks.
La. But that is what I do think.
Soc. And yet men who thus run risks and endure are foolish,
Laches, in comparison of those who do the same things, having the
skill to do them.
La. That is true.
Soc. But foolish boldness and endurance appeared before to be base
and hurtful to us.
La. Quite true.
Soc. Whereas courage was acknowledged to be a noble quality.
La. True.
Soc. And now on the contrary we are saying that the foolish
endurance, which was before held in dishonour, is courage.
La. Very true.
Soc. And are we right in saying so?
La. Indeed, Socrates, I am sure that we are not right.
Soc. Then according to your statement, you and I, Laches, are not
attuned to the Dorian mode, which is a harmony of words and deeds; for
our deeds are not in accordance with our words. Any one would say that
we had courage who saw us in action, but not, I imagine, he who
heard us talking about courage just now.
La. That is most true.
Soc. And is this condition of ours satisfactory?
La. Quite the reverse.
Soc. Suppose, however, that we admit the principle of which we are
speaking to a certain extent.
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