 
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | >7<
La. Behold, Socrates, how admirably, as he thinks, he dresses
himself out in words, while seeking to deprive of the honour of
courage those whom all the world acknowledges to be courageous.
Nic. Not so, Laches, but do not be alarmed; for I am quite willing
to say of you and also of Lamachus, and of many other Athenians,
that you are courageous and therefore wise.
La. I could answer that; but I would not have you cast in my teeth
that I am a haughty Aexonian.
Soc. Do not answer him, Laches; I rather fancy that you are not
aware of the source from which his wisdom is derived. He has got all
this from my friend Damon, and Damon is always with Prodicus, who,
of all the Sophists, is considered to be the best puller to pieces
of words of this sort.
La. Yes, Socrates; and the examination of such niceties is a much
more suitable employment for a Sophist than for a great statesman whom
the city chooses to preside over her.
Soc. Yes, my sweet friend, but a great statesman is likely to have a
great intelligence. And I think that the view which is implied in
Nicias' definition of courage is worthy of examination.
La. Then examine for yourself, Socrates.
Soc. That is what I am going to do, my dear friend. Do not, however,
suppose I shall let you out of the partnership; for I shall expect you
to apply your mind, and join with me in the consideration of the
question.
La. I will if you think that I ought.
Soc. Yes, I do; but I must beg of you, Nicias, to begin again. You
remember that we originally considered courage to be a part of virtue.
Nic. Very true.
Soc. And you yourself said that it was a part; and there were many
other parts, all of which taken together are called virtue.
Nic. Certainly.
Soc. Do you agree with me about the parts? For I say that justice,
temperance, and the like, are all of them parts of virtue as well as
courage. Would you not say the same?
Nic. Certainly.
Soc. Well then, so far we are agreed. And now let us proceed a step,
and try to arrive at a similar agreement about the fearful and the
hopeful: I do not want you to be thinking one thing and myself
another. Let me then tell you my own opinion, and if I am wrong you
shall set me in my opinion the terrible and the are the things which
do or do not create fear, and fear is not of the present, nor of the
past, but is of future and expected evil. Do you not agree to that,
Laches?
La. Yes, Socrates, entirely.
Soc. That is my view, Nicias; the terrible things, as I should
say, are the evils which are future; and the hopeful are the good or
not evil things which are future. Do you or do you not agree with me?
Nic. I agree.
Soc. And the knowledge of these things you call courage?
Nic. Precisely.
Soc. And now let me see whether you agree with Laches and myself
as to a third point.
Nic. What is that?
Soc. I will tell you. He and I have a notion that there is not one
knowledge or science of the past, another of the present, a third of
what is likely to be best and what will be best in the future; but
that of all three there is one science only: for example, there is one
science of medicine which is concerned with the inspection of health
equally in all times, present, past, and future; and one science of
husbandry in like manner, which is concerned with the productions of
the earth in all times. As to the art of the general, you yourselves
will be my witnesses that he has an excellent foreknowledge of the
future, and that he claims to be the master and not the servant of the
soothsayer, because he knows better what is happening or is likely
to happen in war: and accordingly the law places the soothsayer
under the general, and not the general under the soothsayer. Am I
not correct in saying so, Laches?
La. Quite correct.
Soc. And do you, Nicias, also acknowledge that the same science
has understanding of the same things, whether future, present, or
past?
Nic. Yes, indeed Socrates; that is my opinion.
Soc. And courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of the
fearful and of the hopeful?
Nic. Yes.
Soc. And the fearful, and the hopeful, are admitted to be future
goods and future evils?
Nic. True.
Soc. And the same science has to do with the same things in the
future or at any time?
Nic. That is true.
Soc. Then courage is not the science which is concerned with the
fearful and hopeful, for they are future only; courage, like the other
sciences, is concerned not only with good and evil of the future,
but of the present and past, and of any time?
Nic. That, as I suppose, is true.
Soc. Then the answer which you have given, Nicias, includes only a
third part of courage; but our question extended to the whole nature
of courage: and according to your view, that is, according to your
present view, courage is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the
fearful, but seems to include nearly every good and evil without
reference to time. What do you say to that alteration in your
statement?
Nic. I agree, Socrates.
Soc. But then, my dear friend, if a man knew all good and evil,
and how. they are, and have been, and will be produced, would he not
be perfect, and wanting in no virtue, whether justice, or
temperance, or holiness? He would possess them all, and he would
know which were dangers' and which were not, and guard against them
whether they were supernatural or natural; and he would provide the
good, as he would know how to deal both with gods or men.
Nic. I think, Socrates, that there is a great deal of truth in
what you say.
Soc. But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new definition
of yours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue?
Nic. It would seem so.
Soc. But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue?
Nic. Yes, that was what we were saying.
Soc. And that is in contradiction with our present view?
Nic. That appears to be the case.
Soc. Then, Nicias, we have not discovered what courage is.
Nic. We have not.
La. And yet, friend Nicias,l imagined that you would have made the
discovery, when you were so contemptuous of the answers which I made
to Socrates. I had very great hopes that you would have been
enlightened by the wisdom of Damon.
Nic. I perceive, Laches, that you think nothing of having
displayed your ignorance of the nature of courage, but you look only
to see whether I have not made a similar display; and if we are both
equally ignorant of the things which a man who is good for anything
should know, that, I suppose, will be of no consequence. You certainly
appear to me very like the rest of the world, looking at your
neighbour and not at yourself. I am of opinion that enough has been
said on the subject which we have been discussing; and if anything has
been imperfectly said, that may be hereafter corrected by the help
of Damon, whom you think to laugh down, although you have never seen
him, and with the help of others. And when I am satisfied myself, I
will freely impart my satisfaction to you, for I think that you are
very much in want of knowledge.
La. You are a philosopher, Nicias; of that I am aware:
nevertheless I would recommend Lysimachus and Melesias not to take you
and me as advisers about the education of their children; but, as I
said at first, they should ask Socrates and not let him off; if my own
sons were old enough, I would have asked him myself.
Nic. To that I quite agree, if Socrates is willing to take them
under his charge. I should not wish for any one else to be the tutor
of Niceratus. But I observe that when I mention the matter to him he
recommends to me some other tutor and refuses himself. Perhaps he
may be more ready to listen to you, Lysimachus.
Lys. He ought, Nicias: for certainly I would do things for him which
I would not do for many others. What do you say, Socrates-will you
comply? And are you ready to give assistance in the improvement of the
youths?
Soc. Indeed, Lysimachus, I should be very wrong in refusing to aid
in the improvement of anybody. And if I had shown in this conversation
that I had a knowledge which Nicias and Laches have not, then I
admit that you would be right in inviting me to perform this duty; but
as we are all in the same perplexity, why should one of us be
preferred to another? I certainly think that no one should; and
under these circumstances, let me offer you a piece of advice (and
this need not go further than ourselves). I maintain, my friends, that
every one of us should seek out the best teacher whom he can find,
first for ourselves, who are greatly in need of one, and then for
the youth, regardless of expense or anything. But I cannot advise that
we remain as we are. And if any one laughs at us for going to school
at our age, I would quote to them the authority of Homer, who says,
that
Modesty is not good for a needy man.
Let us, then, regardless of what may be said of us, make the education
of the youths our own education.
Lys. I like your proposal, Socrates; and as I am the oldest, I am
also the most eager to go to school with the boys. Let me beg a favour
of you: Come to my house to-morrow at dawn, and we will advise about
these matters. For the present, let us make an end of the
conversation.
Soc. I will come to you to-morrow, Lysimachus, as you propose, God
willing.
-THE END-
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | >7<
|
