 
1 | 2 | 3 | >4< | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 I doubt whether that is the real reason, I said; for I should
imagine that your father Democrates, and your mother, do permit you to
do many things already, and do not wait until you are of age: for
example, if they want anything read or written, you, I presume,
would be the first person in the house who is summoned by them.
Very true.
And you would be allowed to write or read the letters in any order
which you please, or to take up the lyre and tune the notes, and
play with the fingers, or strike with the plectrum, exactly as you
please, and neither father nor mother would interfere with you.
That is true, he said.
Then what can be the reason, Lysis, I said, why they allow you to do
the one and not the other?
I suppose, he said, because I understand the one, and not the other.
Yes, my dear youth, I said, the reason is not any deficiency of
years, but a deficiency of knowledge; and whenever your father
thinks that you are wiser than he is, he will instantly commit himself
and his possessions to you.
I think so.
Aye, I said; and about your neighbour, too, does not the same rule
hold as about your father? If he is satisfied that you know more of
housekeeping than he does, will he continue to administer his
affairs himself, or will he commit them to you?
I think that he will commit them to me.
Will not the Athenian people, too, entrust their affairs to you when
they see that you have wisdom enough to manage them?
Yes.
And oh! let me put another case, I said: There is the great king,
and he has an eldest son, who is the Prince of Asia;-suppose that
you and I go to him and establish to his satisfaction that we are
better cooks than his son, will he not entrust to us the prerogative
of making soup, and putting in anything that we like while the pot
is boiling, rather than to the Prince of Asia, who is his son?
To us, clearly.
And we shall be allowed to throw in salt by handfuls, whereas the
son will not be allowed to put in as much as he can take up between
his fingers?
Of course.
Or suppose again that the son has bad eyes, will he allow him, or
will he not allow him, to touch his own eyes if he thinks that he
has no knowledge of medicine?
He will not allow him.
Whereas, if he supposes us to have a knowledge of medicine, he
will allow us to do what we like with him-even to open the eyes wide
and sprinkle ashes upon them, because he supposes that we know what is
best?
That is true.
And everything in which we appear to him to be wiser than himself or
his son he will commit to us?
That is very true, Socrates, he replied.
Then now, my dear Lysis, I said, you perceive that in things which
we know every one will trust us-Hellenes and barbarians, men and
women-and we may do as we please about them, and no one will like to
interfere with us; we shall be free, and masters of others; and
these things will be really ours, for we shall be benefited by them.
But in things of which we have no understanding, no one will trust
us to do as seems good to us-they will hinder us as far as they can;
and not only strangers, but father and mother, and the friend, if
there be one, who is dearer still, will also hinder us; and we shall
be subject to others; and these things will not be ours, for we
shall not be benefited by them. Do you agree?
He assented.
And shall we be friends to others, and will any others love us, in
as far as we are useless to them?
Certainly not.
Neither can your father or mother love you, nor can anybody love
anybody else, in so far as they are useless to them?
No.
And therefore, my boy, if you are wise, -all men will be your
friends and kindred, for you will be useful and good; but if you are
not wise, neither father, nor mother, nor kindred, nor any one else,
will be your friends. And in matters of which you have as yet no
knowledge, can you have any conceit of knowledge?
That is impossible, he replied. 1 | 2 | 3 | >4< | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10
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