 
1 | 2 | 3 | >4< | 5 | 6 | 7
Euth. And what I said was true, Socrates.
Soc. No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many
other pious acts?
Euth. There are.
Soc. Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three
examples of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all
pious things to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea
which made the impious impious, and the pious pious?
Euth. I remember.
Soc. Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall
have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure
actions, whether yours or those of any one else, and then I shall be
able to say that such and such an action is pious, such another
impious.
Euth. I will tell you, if you like.
Soc. I should very much like.
Euth. Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is
that which is not dear to them.
Soc. Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the sort of
answer which I wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I
cannot as yet tell, although I make no doubt that you will prove the
truth of your words.
Euth. Of course.
Soc. Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. That
thing or person which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing
or person which is hateful to the gods is impious, these two being the
extreme opposites of one another. Was not that said?
Euth. It was.
Soc. And well said?
Euth. Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly said.
Soc. And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities
and hatreds and differences?
Euth. Yes, that was also said.
Soc. And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose
for example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number;
do differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance
with one another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end
to them by a sum?
Euth. True.
Soc. Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly
end the differences by measuring?
Euth. Very true.
Soc. And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting
to a weighing machine?
Euth. To be sure.
Soc. But what differences are there which cannot be thus decided,
and which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one
another? I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment,
and therefore I will suggest that these enmities arise when the
matters of difference are the just and unjust, good and evil,
honourable and dishonourable. Are not these the points about which men
differ, and about which when we are unable satisfactorily to decide
our differences, you and I and all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel?
Euth. Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which we
quarrel is such as you describe.
Soc. And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur,
are of a like nature?
Euth. Certainly they are.
Soc. They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and
evil, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there would
have been no quarrels among them, if there had been no such
differences-would there now?
Euth. You are quite right.
Soc. Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just
and good, and hate the opposite of them?
Euth. Very true.
Soc. But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just
and others as unjust,-about these they dispute; and so there arise
wars and fightings among them.
Euth. Very true.
Soc. Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the
gods, and are both hateful and dear to them?
Euth. True.
Soc. And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious
and also impious?
Euth. So I should suppose.
Soc. Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not
answered the question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you
to tell me what action is both pious and impious: but now it would
seem that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And
therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may very
likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos
or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to
Here, and there may be other gods who have similar differences of
opinion.
Euth. But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed
as to the propriety of punishing a murderer: there would be no
difference of opinion about that.
1 | 2 | 3 | >4< | 5 | 6 | 7
|
