Charmides, or Temperance - 10
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And will wisdom give health? I said; is not this rather the effect
of medicine? Or does wisdom do the work any of the other arts, do they
not each of them do their own work? Have we not long ago asseverated
that wisdom is only the knowledge of knowledge and of ignorance, and
of nothing else?
That is obvious.
Then wisdom will not be the producer of health.
Certainly not.
The art of health is different.
Yes, different.
Nor does wisdom give advantage, my good friend; for that again we
have just now been attributing to another art.
Very true.
How then can wisdom be advantageous, when giving no advantage?
That, Socrates, is certainly inconceivable.
You see then, Critias, that I was not far wrong in fearing that I
could have no sound notion about wisdom; I was quite right in
depreciating myself; for that which is admitted to be the best of
all things would never have seemed to us useless, if I had been good
for anything at an enquiry. But now I have been utterly defeated,
and have failed to discover what that is to which the imposer of names
gave this name of temperance or wisdom. And yet many more admissions
were made by us than could be fairly granted; for we admitted that
there was a science of science, although the argument said No, and
protested against us; and we admitted further, that this science
knew the works of the other sciences (although this too was denied
by the argument), because we wanted to show that the wise man had
knowledge of what he knew and did not know; also we nobly disregarded,
and never even considered, the impossibility of a man knowing in a
sort of way that which he does not know at all; for our assumption
was, that he knows that which he does not know; than which nothing, as
I think, can be more irrational. And yet, after finding us so easy and
good-natured, the enquiry is still unable to discover the truth; but
mocks us to a degree, and has gone out of its way to prove the
inutility of that which we admitted only by a sort of supposition
and fiction to be the true definition of temperance or wisdom: which
result, as far as I am concerned, is not so much to be lamented, I
said. But for your sake, Charmides, I am very sorry-that you, having
such beauty and such wisdom and temperance of soul, should have no
profit or good in life from your wisdom and temperance. And still more
am I grieved about the charm which I learned with so much pain, and to
so little profit, from the Thracian, for the sake of a thing which
is nothing worth. I think indeed that there is a mistake, and that I
must be a bad enquirer, for wisdom or temperance I believe to be
really a great good; and happy are you, Charmides, if you certainly
possess it. Wherefore examine yourself, and see whether you have
this gift and can do without the charm; for if you can, I would rather
advise you to regard me simply as a fool who is never able to reason
out anything; and to rest assured that the more wise and temperate you
are, the happier you will be.
Charmides said: I am sure that I do not know, Socrates, whether I
have or have not this gift of wisdom and temperance; for how can I
know whether I have a thing, of which even you and Critias are, as you
say, unable to discover the nature?-(not that I believe you.) And
further, I am sure, Socrates, that I do need the charm, and as far
as I am concerned, I shall be willing to be charmed by you daily,
until you say that I have had enough.
Very good, Charmides, said Critias; if you do this I shall have a
proof of your temperance, that is, if you allow yourself to be charmed
by Socrates, and never desert him at all.
You may depend on my following and not deserting him, said
Charmides: if you who are my guardian command me, I should be very
wrong not to obey you.
And I do command you, he said.
Then I will do as you say, and begin this very day.
You sirs, I said, what are you conspiring about?
We are not conspiring, said Charmides, we have conspired already.
And are you about to use violence, without even going through the
forms of justice?
Yes, I shall use violence, he replied, since he orders me; and
therefore you had better consider well.
But the time for consideration has passed, I said, when violence
is employed; and you, when you are determined on anything, and in
the mood of violence, are irresistible.
Do not you resist me then, he said.
I will not resist you, I replied.
-THE END-
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